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RESEARCH NOTE
Urgent tasks for research on 
Russian TNCs
Alexey V. Kuznetsov *
Rapid cross-border expansion of Russian firms in the past decade has 
stimulated much research interest in Russian foreign direct investment 
(FDI), especially since 2003. This paper identifies several problems 
in the existing literature which still persist, in spite of the significant 
progress in research on Russian transnational corporations (TNCs). The 
paper stresses the importance of Russia’s unique recent history and its 
implications for the choice of investment destination for Russian firms. 
This paper concludes by suggesting that studies focusing on a more 
nuanced influence of the State on large as well as small and medium-
sized Russian TNCs should be undertaken. 
Keywords: Russian TNCs, multidisciplinary approach, 
internationalization, the post-communist economy, FDI drivers, 
neighbourhood effect, state support
1.  Introduction
Less than one third of the 20 largest Russian transnational corporations 
(TNCs) began their cross-border expansion in the 1990s or during the Soviet 
period (Kuznetsov and Chetverikova, 2009a, pp. 18–25). Illegal forms of capital 
flight was more common in the first decade of the difficult post-communist 
transformation. At the end of 2000, the Russian outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stock was only $20.1 billion and accounted for mere 0.3% 
of the global outward FDI stock (UNCTAD, 2010, pp. 172, 176). The real boom 
in Russian FDI began in 2003 and its peak was reached in 2007. During the 
current global economic crisis, market capitalization of companies worldwide 
fell. This process led to a significant reduction in the value of Russian foreign 
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assets although instances of large divestments by Russian TNCs were 
rare. As a result, the Russian FDI outward stock, which reached $370.2 
billion at the end of 2007, decreased to $205.6 billion at the end of 
2008. Then it reached $318.7 billion at the end of 2009 (Bank of Russia, 
2010a). Nevertheless, Russia now ranks 15th in terms of outward FDI 
stock and accounts for 1.3% of the world total (UNCTAD, 2010, pp. 
172–176).
The increase of Russian FDI has naturally stimulated scientific 
research on Russian FDI and its emerging TNCs. Before the boom of 
Russian FDI started, we could find only one monograph on the topic 
(Bulatov, 1997) and several articles in leading Russian and Western 
scientific journals or collected volumes (Bulatov, 1995, 1998, 2001; 
Vinslav et al., 1999; Heinrich, 2001; Liuhto, 2001a, 2001b; Liuhto and 
Jumpponen, 2001; Peregudov, 2001; Andreff, 2002; Boyarko, 2002). 
In contrast, several monographs, special reports and more than 150 
articles on various aspects of Russian FDI and TNCs appeared in the 
period 2003–2009. This was not surprising because Russian researchers 
tried to understand significant changes in the strategies of Russian 
companies while foreign experts (especially from the EU countries) 
tried to assess the drivers of unexpected increase in Russian investment 
in their countries. 
Despite the rapid growth of the scholarship on Russian FDI in 
recent years, several topics remain a field for heated discussions. In 
the remainder of this paper, I will identify two areas requiring further 
research. One group of on-going research questions are concerned with 
the drivers of Russian investment expansion (section 2). While scholars 
usually cite the lack of information as the origin of disagreements, I 
would argue that the main problem is methodological. The second 
group of research questions is over the role of the State and features of 
State support for Russian FDI (section 3). Concluding thoughts are give 
in section 4. 
2.  Drivers of Russian internationalization – do we 
need a new multidisciplinary theory?
The analysis of Russian TNCs is often based on comparison with 
TNCs from other countries. Russian TNCs have also been analysed in 
the framework of the theory of internationalization which, in fact, are 
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developed over the years for the analysis of TNCs from the United 
States and West European countries (Andreff, 2003; Kalotay, 2004; 
Bereznoy, 2008; Filippov, 2008). Thus, the main task for the research on 
Russian TNCs is the explanation of various deviation of Russian outward 
FDI from the theoretical norm and “typical” TNCs based in developed 
countries. 
The level of economic development is usually considered as a 
basic factor explaining the international investment position of the 
country. However, the case of the Russia Federation is at odds with 
such investment-development path theory (Kalotay, 2008, pp. 88–89). 
Different explanations for the unique evolution of Russian FDI have 
been put forward (e.g. Kuznetsov, 2007a, pp. 7-11). The most widely 
accepted argument is that Russian FDI is a form of capital flight prompted 
by the unfavourable business climate in the Russian Federation (e.g. 
Kheyfets, 2008, p. 10). However, it is questionable whether cross-
border investment by many Russian TNCs really constitutes a form of 
capital flight. Many Russian conglomerates (oligarchs’ empires) have 
rapidly evolved into classic TNCs. Furthermore, the  problems of Russian 
business environment are not necessarily unique (Bereznoy, 2008, pp. 
33 –36). 
The difficulty in analyzing Russian TNCs arises mostly from the 
inadequacy of existing FDI theory. Kalman Kalotay has shown how FDI 
theory might be developed in light of the findings from research on 
Russian TNCs (e.g. Kalotay, 2008, pp. 99–103). Clearly, TNCs’ decisions 
concerning FDI depend on their characteristics, objective of undertaking 
FDI, as well as host and home country factors. However, what are 
the features that are crucial for FDI decisions? Before developing an 
analytical framework, it is necessary to ask if it is productive to add new 
elements for every new phenomenon of FDI to the existing theories. 
I am not convinced that modern TNCs from the United States 
and Western Europe are “typical” TNCs while Russian TNCs belong to a 
special case. We find very different types of firms among Russian TNCs, 
some of which are comparable to “classic” Western TNCs while others are 
very different from those based in developed countries (e.g. Kuznetsov, 
2007a). We may also note that different types of British TNCs existed 
one century ago, such as so-called free-standing companies (Wilkins, 
1988). New types of TNCs are emerging among developed countries, 
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too – for instance, international new ventures and re-internationalized 
companies (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 1995; Welch and Welch, 2009). 
The late Professor John Dunning recognized the need for widening 
the eclectic paradigm of international production to embrace asset-
augmenting FDI. Some companies try to overcome their disadvantages 
by acquiring strategic assets overseas. For instance, steel and chemical 
TNCs often buy foreign firms with unique technologies. Such cases 
are typical for firms in the Russian Federation and other “emerging 
markets” (e.g. Moon and Roehl, 2001), but FDI with a similar motive is 
undertaken by in most developed countries. For example, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, German oil companies rapidly expanded abroad for the 
control of resources. 
The picture becomes even more complicated in the case of large 
TNCs with many affiliates which simultaneously start several different 
FDI projects. In such cases, TNCs can support even loss-making foreign 
affiliates for a period of time.1 Some large Russian companies attempt 
to invest abroad (usually in the CIS) simply because almost all similar 
companies try to develop overseas business. One failure with a FDI 
project is not crucial for such companies. If their foreign affiliates are 
successful, companies will receive a new useful experience for future 
projects.
There are several levels of explanation for FDI expansion and we 
need both microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches, drawing 
on the ideas from economic and political theory of international 
relations, both from the static and dynamic perspectives. On the one 
hand, all of the drivers and determinants of FDI are connected with 
each other. That is why some scholars try to develop one theory for 
the explanation of the whole FDI phenomenon. On the other hand, at 
the firm level, it is easier to analyse TNCs’ investment activities from a 
more specific perspective applicable only to certain specific cases. For 
example, individual wishes of  business tycoons are not very important 
for the explanation of modern German or British FDI because there 
are hundreds sizable German or British TNCs for any individual TNC 
to matter. In contrast, the owners of the few competitive industrial 
1  The best example of such a TNC is Basic Element, which is one of the largest 
Russian industrial groups, that undergoes problems of many foreign affiliates during the 
global crisis but continues its worldwide FDI activities.
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giants in the Russian Federation can determine the whole character of 
its FDI expansion. For instance, Alexey Mordashov controls the largest 
Russian steel TNC, Severstal (see table 1). The company is registered 
and listed in the Russian Federation (while its every second member on 
the Board is foreigner). In a contrasting example, Roman Abramovich 
and his partners own the second largest Russian steel TNC, Evraz, which 
is registered in Luxembourg and its shares are listed only on the London 
Stock Exchange. This decision cannot be explained by some conflicts 
between Mr. Abramovich and the Government. However, it is well-
known that Mr. Abramovich prefers to live in the United Kingdom (where 
he stayed even when he was the governor of Chukotka District of the 
Russian Federation). Indeed, the influence of particular circumstance 
and preferences of individual owners can be a significant determinant 
of Russian FDI. Their personal decisions can also determine the role of 
FDI expansion for their companies – some of these businessmen want 
to become members of the “global business elite” while others try to 
seek only political rent within the Russian Federation. As a result, there 
are many large private oil companies in Russia but only few of them try 
to invest abroad.
I think the most underestimated approaches in FDI theories 
are historical and geographical methods of analysis.2 Two important 
aspects deserve special consideration. First, a non-linear characteristic 
of economic development determines the importance of various 
indicators and hence GDP per capita may not be the most appropriate 
indicator. Second, historical and geographical circumstances may give 
rise to a significant neighbourhood effect for FDI.
Competitive advantages of companies are typically based on their 
knowledge assets and sometimes can be exploited only by way of FDI. 
For example, Russian managers have received a unique experience from 
the period of instability during the post-communist transformation and 
can use it in their competition with global leaders in various developing 
countries. Flexible organizational structures of large Russian private 
2   It is well known that some countries have followed  an uneven path of economic 
development. For example, Argentina, Russia (within its modern borders) and some 
Central European countries were among high income countries at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The first group of TNCs from these countries appeared a century ago. 
However, rapid economic internationalization of these countries began only in the 1990s 
or the 2000s. Researchers often underestimate the role of human capital and temporary 
institutional barriers in FDI processes.
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Table 1. Ranking of 20 top Russian multinationals, end of 2008
No. Name Main industries of specialization
Foreign 
assets, 
US$ million 
Foreign 
sales, 
US$ million
Foreign 
employ ment, 
thousand
1 LUKOIL
Extraction of oil & gas / 
refined petroleum 
products and chemicals / 
petroleum products retail 
23,577 87,677 23.0
2 Gazprom
Extraction of oil & gas / 
gas distribution / electricity 
production
21,408 79,412 ~ 8.0a
3 Severstal Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coals ~ 12,198
a 13,514 ~ 14.0a
4 Evraz Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coals 11,196 12,805 29.5
5 RENOVA Conglomerate ~ 8,500a 9,150 31.2
6 Basic Element
Conglomerate (non-
ferrous metals dominate) ~ 6,200
a n.a. n.a.
7 Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK)
Iron & steel / mining of 
metal ores 4,985 7,138 5.9
8 Sovcomflot Sea transport ~ 4,642a n.a. ~ 1.0a
9 Norilsk Nickel
Non-ferrous metals / 
mining of metal ores 4,600 10,355 3.9
10 VimpelCom Telecommunications 4,386 1,520 10.3
11 Sistema
Conglomerate 
(telecommunications 
dominate)
3,804 3,983 11.0
12 TMK Metal tubes 2,361 2,302 4.1
13 Mechel
Iron & steel / mining of 
metal ores and coals / 
electricity production
2,315 4,609 7.9
14 Zarubezhneft Extraction of oil / refined petroleum products ~ 1,900
a n.a. 0.7
15 INTER RAO UES
Electricity production and 
supply 1,374 1,594 ~ 13.0
a
16 Koks Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coals 1,073 2,091 3.5
17 Eurochem Agrochemicals 1,015 3,168 1.1
18 ALROSA
Mining of diamonds / 
jewelry production and 
trade
860 1,472 3.1
19 FESCO Sea and railway transport ~ 707a 75 ~ 1.0a
20 OMZ Electric power machines / iron & steel 377 588 1.1
Source:  Kuznetsov and Chetverikova (2009a, p. 2, 9).
a  The symbol ‘~’ indicates that the amount is an estimate by the IMEMO team. In other cases reports and questionnaire 
answers of companies are used.
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companies are also very convenient for TNCs in some circumstances 
(Kuncinas, 2006, p. 24). Of course, the dominance of oil and metal 
companies among largest Russian TNCs raises questions about the real 
scale of Russian human capital (see table 1). However, we see rapid 
internationalization of the Russian telecommunication TNCs and many 
middle technology-based Russian TNCs, including IT-companies such as 
Tecnoserv, Croc, LANIT and Playfon (Kuznetsov, 2010, p. 20). 
Territorial proximity and close psychic distance (due to linguistic, 
cultural and historical ties) play an important role in explaining the 
geographical distribution of Russian FDI. The “neighbourhood effect” 
is evident in FDI from a range of countries, but it is especially relevant 
for Russian TNCs for which the main determinant can be found in its 
historical circumstances (Kuznetsov, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
Although the world’s largest economies, except China and Japan, 
are also among the main recipients of FDI from Russia,3 the shares of 
Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Serbia or Montenegro in Russian 
FDI were much higher than their shares in global FDI (UNCTAD, 2010, 
pp. 167–176). Russian TNCs are “fortunate” in terms of neighbouring 
countries. Many other emerging economies share the border with 
developing countries with few possibilities for significant FDI (e.g. India 
and South Africa) or with rich countries with higher wages and intensive 
competition (e.g. Mexico and Slovenia). The Russian Federation, in 
contrast, is largely surrounded countries with Russian or other Slavic-
speaking population, common features of economic and legal systems, 
problems of post-communist transformation, developed industrial 
chains and strong cultural and political ties. 
As a result, the shares of former Soviet republics and some 
Slavonic Balkan countries are significant (see table 2). Moreover, we 
should remember that almost two thirds of Russian FDI in the period 
2007–2009 was round-tripping and trans-shipping FDI received in certain 
offshore economies. The final destination of these types FDI flows are 
usually the CIS, Central European countries or the Russian Federation 
itself (e.g. Pelto et al., 2003). In many cases, Russian companies 
3  Russian FDI in the United Kingdom and Mediterranean countries are often 
connected with investments in real estate. The appearance of non-European countries 
among the most important destinations (for instance, Canada, India and the United Arab 
Emirates) may perhaps shows the maturity of some Russian companies.
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Table 2. Destinations of non-financial FDI outflows (net) 
from Russia, 2007-2009
Destination 2007, US$ million
2008, 
US$ million
2009, 
US$ million
Total, 
US$ million
Total, 
%
CIS countries 3,244 2,413 3,109 8,766 6.1
Ukraine 1,601 551 671 2,823 2.0
Belarus 765 619 896 2,280 1.6
Kazakhstan 103 326 974 1,403 1.0
Uzbekistan 354 414 223 991 0.7
Armenia 269 266 166 701 0.5
Other countries 152 237 179 568 0.4
Top 10 destinations of 
mainly round-tripping and 
trans-shipping FDI
34,302 26,548 29,320 90,170 62.5
Cyprus 14,630 9,369 16,930 40,929 28.4
Netherlands 12,502 2,732 3,624 18,858 13.1
British Virgin Islands 1,425 3,790 2,366 7,581 5.3
Bermuda 2,689 3,257 793 6,739 4.5
Switzerland 1,404 2,426 1,807 5,637 3.9
Luxembourg 497 2,722 1,420 4,639 3.2
Gibraltar 886 1,190 2,127 4,203 2.9
Cayman Islands 52 718 296 1,066 0.7
Belize -10 50 236 276 0.2
Ireland 227 294 -279 242 0.2
Five largest EU members 3,731 6,716 4,263 14,710 10.2
Germany 674 1,860 1,178 3,712 2.6
United Kingdom 2,454 3,886 2,166 8,506 5.9
France 257 217 386 860 0.6
Italy 87 295 162 544 0.4
Spain 259 458 371 1,088 0.8
Top 10 other European 
destinations 1,001 2,237 4,116 7,354 5.1
Hungary -12 542 1,789 2,319 1.6
Austria 230 253 458 941 0.7
Bulgaria 168 387 229 784 0.5
Czech Republic 248 319 142 709 0.5
Serbia 44 11 609 664 0.5
Finland 110 154 185 449 0.3
Montenegro 188 173 85 446 0.3
Sweden -55 177 254 376 0.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 55 287 343 0.2
Latvia 79 166 78 323 0.2
United States 974 7,265 1,628 9,867 6.8
Canada 181 6,723 20 6,924 4.8
United Arab Emirates 901 240 60 1,201 0.8
Turkey 183 272 106 561 0.4
India 13 401 2 416 0.3
Other destinations 681 1,387 2,244 4,312 3.0
Total 45,211 54,202 44,868 144,281 100.0
Source:  Bank of Russia (2010b).
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established small trade and service affiliates abroad in the 1990s for 
specific purposes necessitated by the post-communist transformation. 
For example, Russian businessmen tried to take advantages of the 
privileges accorded to foreign investors by the Government during the 
privatization through round-tripping FDI. They wanted to avoid barter or 
even artificial bankruptcy of their enterprises when the whole Russian 
economy had a severe non-payment crisis and a lack of liquid assets. 
In the 2000s, owners of Russian companies continued to use offshore 
economies for other purposes (including FDI activities) because of the 
lack of confidence in the protection of property rights in the Russian 
Federation.
Given the historical, cultural and institutional background of 
Russian TNCs, which differ significantly from those of developed country 
TNCs, analysis of those firms would necessitate a framework that could 
take into account those factors. 
3.  The role of the State
Another urgent research issue is the role of the State in Russian 
TNCs’ expansion abroad. There is a wide-spread perception that the 
State has a significant influence on the operation of Russian TNCs, 
especially among foreign scholars. Of course, the strength of a State can 
be understood in different ways but I prefer to distinguish the abilities 
of the ruling groups to hold their political power from their abilities to 
realize political goals. In the case of the Russian Federation, in spite 
of absolute political dominance of the ruling party “United Russia”, 
the administration of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin 
has not been able to make significant progress in the acceleration of 
Russian industrial modernization or in the struggle against corruption 
(although these aims are among their priorities). The success of the 
Russian Federation in foreign policy is more evident because some of 
the weaknesses of the post-communist era were rectified in the 2000s. 
However, several urgent problems still persist in the Russian Federation, 
including the visa regime of the EU countries for Russian nationals, 
which has been likened to a new Iron Curtain separating  the Russian 
Federation from the rest of  Europe.
It is difficult to draw a distinction between Russian State-owned 
and private companies in some cases. In fact, “patriots” (State-controlled 
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corporations with political goals which take precedence over business 
rationality) and “conformers” (private companies which frequently 
operate in line with Russia’s official policies) are rare examples.4 It is 
not uncommon that top-managers of a Russian TNC under State control 
abuse their position and pursue their own interests. Such managers 
ignore both Russian national interests as well as the economic objectives 
of the TNC. Thus, it is impossible to characterize all State-owned firms 
as patriots. Managers of the firms in the “conformer” category very 
often have close relationship with State officials and they often exploit 
such relations successfully. A good example is found in Moscow. 
Mr. Luzhkov was the mayor of the Russian capital during the period 
1992–2010.5 It is difficult to see any realization of Russian national 
interests in Luzhkov’s activities.  While his wife Elena Baturina became 
billionaire and the richest woman in Russia, Moscow suffers from a lack 
of basic infrastructure. Baturina’s company controls a large part of the 
construction industry in Moscow and now invests abroad. 
Moreover, it is difficult even to say that Russian private companies 
are more efficient (in pure economic terms) than similar Russian State-
owned corporations. The main reason for this situation is connected 
with key features of the Russian privatization process in the 1990s. 
In fact, some resource-based companies had owners who had close 
relationship with Boris Yeltsin’s administration imposed on them. In 
contrast, some State-owned firms were “saved” from such questionable 
privatization. For example, in the 1990s, Zarubezhneft controlled only a 
former Soviet oil project in Viet Nam which was very profitable for the 
State. Its planned privatization was shelved and, today, Zarubezhneft 
successfully continues its foreign operations. Furthermore, this State-
owned company has diversifies its operation in terms of geography and 
business.
Some companies have assumed a leading role in the Russian 
economy due to State participation but it is difficult to see any special 
State support in their cross-border expansion. For example, the Bank 
of Moscow is one of the largest Russian banks with affiliates in Belarus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Serbia and Ukraine. It was founded by the Moscow 
regional government, which today controls two thirds of the Bank’s 
4   These terms coined by Vahtra and Liuhto (2004, p. 94).
5   After the political reform introduced by Vladimir Putin, the Mayor of Moscow is 
chosen by presidential appointment rather than election. 
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shares. Indeed, the Bank of Moscow was allowed to compete with 
State-owned giant Sberbank due to the participation of the regional 
government. However, the Bank of Moscow became more successful in 
its management and tried to conquer markets of neighbouring countries 
at the beginning of the 2000s (its affiliate in Serbia was founded only in 
2008). As for Sberbank, it began its foreign expansion only in 2006 and 
today its presence abroad is limited to the CIS area.
At the same time, we can see some examples of coordination 
between Russian TNCs and Russian foreign policy. For instance, Russian 
private companies toed the line with the Russian Government’s official 
position and temporarily decreased their economic contacts with 
Estonia in 2007 after a grave of Soviet soldiers was desecrated in Tallinn 
(Kuznetsov and Chetverikova, 2009b, pp. 75–76). However, it is difficult 
to find strictly defined Russian national goals (interests) in many other 
cases. For example, there are opposite views on the gas conflicts with 
Ukraine and investment in gas transportation in Belarus. Some experts 
speak of the end of Russian gas diplomacy and real transformation of 
Gazprom into a classic TNC while others perceive it as the beginning of 
an active gas diplomacy. Russian political influence is a factor of Russian 
investment expansion in Central Asia (much like in the case of United 
States firms’ investment in Latin America or German TNCs’ investment 
in Eastern Europe) but it is not a crucial factor (Kuznetsov, 2008c). It 
is impossible to prove strong connection between Russian investment 
and Russian foreign policy in countries of Asia and Africa, although 
sometimes the Russian Government tries to help Russian private TNCs in 
those regions.6 The Government usually protects existing projects while 
its role at the initial stages of Russian investment is not significant.
The current Government support for Russian outward FDI is weak 
and uses only a few instruments (Kheyfets, 2007; Kuznetsov, 2007b, 
pp. 259–261). The main problem seems to be the lack of experience 
in investing abroad. For example, the State insurance agency for 
export credits and FDI is only in plans of the Russian State Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank). The 
Russian Federation has also modest positions in the field of double 
taxation and bilateral investment treaties, especially outside traditional 
regions of Russian firms’ foreign expansion. The whole ideology of the 
6   The best example is Rusal.
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current investment policy appears to centre on the protection of dozens 
of existing Russian TNCs. 
Large Russian companies sometimes try to enlist the support of 
the Government with claims of investment protectionism in foreign 
countries. The best example was Surgutneftegaz. In 2009, this Russian 
company tried to become a direct investor of the largest Hungarian oil and 
gas company MOL through the purchase of its 21.2% shares. However, 
the Hungarian Government changed the law and Surgutneftegaz 
became a portfolio investment. Of course, Surgutneftegaz gave a cause 
for such a decision because there was no information about its real 
owners, but at the same time, there is widely held perception that the 
political establishment in the EU does not welcome the rise of Russian 
TNCs, especially in the energy industry.7
5.  Conclusions
 In this paper, my aim is to demonstrate ambiguity of some 
wide-spread perceptions about the activities of Russian TNCs and then 
to outline urgent tasks for further research on Russian TNCs. 
First, I stress that the Russian Federation has followed a 
unique and unusual path of economic development in the twentieth 
century because of its political situation. Although TNCs from the 
Russian Federation may have the similar drivers and determinates of 
internationalization as do developed country TNCs to an extent, the type 
of dominant large national conglomerates that are typical in the Russian 
Federation are rare in developed countries. As a consequence, scholars 
in the field of Russian FDI need to take note of the specific nature of 
certain Russian TNCs, most notably the influence of the Soviet past on 
the economic activities of the Russian Federation and its neighbouring 
countries. The Soviet past has created certain institutional barriers for 
outward FDI. At the same time, common history and culture of the CIS 
and Baltic states has facilitated FDI by  Russian TNCs.
Second, I try to draw attention to various patterns of interaction 
between the Russian Government’s officials and Russian State-owned 
and private TNCs. The situation can change when State support for 
7  MOL is a key company for the Nabucco pipeline project, which bypass the 
Russian territory.
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Russian outward FDI becomes more complicated. However, the manner 
of such intervention is not predetermined and may be influenced by 
recommendations of scholars. For example, the choice of the main 
target of State support (Russian business giants or hundreds of middle 
investors) will determine the whole ideology of the Russian policy in 
the field of outward FDI.
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